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INTRODUCTION
All major international investors and banks use sovereign debt default rates to price sovereign bonds and loans as well as to determine a country risk. Furthermore, in recent years many developing countries have negotiated new loan repayment schedules with their government and commercial bank lenders. The aim of this study is to specify a model which would allow prediction of sovereign default/rescheduling rates with a higher accuracy, particularly tailored for the investors interested in the Eastern Europe (EE) region.
The group of 15 EE countries used in this study share similarities in respect of the social, political, geographical, economic and cultural characteristics. Most of the recent studies of sovereign debt problems looked at the middle income countries of Latin America, Asia or Africa, but none of them paid special attention to emerging markets of Eastern Europe, and the period of their transition to market economies. Several earlier studies include data for some of these countries in their multi country data set, however, due to specific common characteristics of EE countries, it is questionable whether conclusions from previous studies looking at all emerging markets can be directly applied to EE countries. Therefore, this paper will focus on EE countries as the very first attempt to model debt rescheduling probabilities for this region.
This paper aims to answer the following questions: (1) What are the most important determinants of EE sovereign debt rescheduling? (2) How accurately those determinants predict sovereign debt rescheduling? (3) How to specify a model that would allow prediction of EE sovereign rescheduling with a higher accuracy? Answers to these questions could be used to derive implications for policy makers and potential creditors and investors in the region.
The countries included in the study are: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Montenegro and Slovak Republic. The regions' debt rescheduling probabilities are tested for the effects of wide range of macroeconomic, financial and political indicators.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Series of financial crises and defaults starting from the late 1970s and early 1980s period (see e.g. Camdessus, 1986 and Cuddington and Smith, 1985) , and later incidents culminating in Argentina's default in 2001, prompted an intense debate about how to prevent crises. As pointed out by Manasse, Roubini and Schimmelpfennig (2003) the literature on debt crisis falls into four broad categories: theoretical models of sovereign default, empirical studies of the determinants of debt crisis, empirical studies of the predictive power of credit ratings and empirical studies of the determination of spreads. Given the aims of our study, the literature we review is focused on the determinants of debt rescheduling and the models used to predict it.
One of the earlier studies by Frank and Cline (1971) applied discriminate analysis to show that it is possible to obtain a very high prediction rate using only two factors, the debt service ratio and the average maturity of debt. Among the first studies using logit analysis were Feder and Just (1976) followed by Feder, Just and Ross (1981) and Feder and Uy (1984) . The authors point out that the analysis of the growth record of many economies indicates that foreign capital is an important factor in the process of economic development. Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) developed a model of borrowing with default, showing that lenders establish debt ceilings above which they are unwilling to increase loans. Further, McFaden et al. (1985) estimate crisis probabilities using data on 93 countries from 1970-1982, concluding that although an econometric model can help to explain sovereign debt problems, it is extremely difficult to develop an early warning system that would predict debt crises in advance as countries may experience heterogeneous repayment problems. They find that the debt burden, the level of per capita income, real GDP growth, and liquidity measures such as non-gold reserves are significant predictors of debt crisis, while the changes in real exchange rates are not.
In most of the empirical studies two groups of main variables were constantly included in econometric analyses: short-term or liquidity factors (also known as traditional debt or financial ratios: debt/GDP, reserves/imports and debt service/export) and long term variables (GDP growth, investments, inflation). For example, Manasse, Roubini and Schimmelpfennig (2003) find solvency problems measured through high total external debt to GDP ratio and liquidity problems measured through short term debt to be highly associated with the debt rescheduling. Hemming and Petrie (2000) present a discussion on fiscal sustainability and develop vulnerability indicators. Hemming and Chalk (2000) for the first time systematically examine the link between fiscal and external sustainability. Furthermore, Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001) study the importance of liquidity factors such as short-term debt, debt service, and the level of international reserves in predicting debt crises, and find that less liquid countries are more likely to default. Additionally, they find that countries that are more open are in a better position to service debt and that overvalued exchange rate hurts the future export performance of the country. Krugman (1987) built theoretical model that highlights the importance of "debt overhang" of the developing nations and derive policy implications about the desirability of forgiving or refinancing such debt. Berg and Sachs (1988) found that higher income inequality is a significant predictor of a higher probability of debt rescheduling in the middle income countries. Also, the open trade regime is a significant predictor of a reduced probability of debt rescheduling. As they pointed out, earlier studies, such as McFadden et al. (1985) , identify variables that are more the symptoms of the crises rather than their fundamental causes.
Political risk and institutional variables are also found to play a key role in determining debt rescheduling among emerging markets countries. Balkan (1992) was the first to find an inverse relationship between rescheduling probabilities for one country and its level of democracy, as well as a direct relationship between probability of rescheduling and political instability. More recent evidence of the significance of political variable can be found in Haque, Nelson and Mathieson (1998) . Brewer and Rivoli (1997) showed that the inclusion of political variables into forecasting models improves the correct prediction rate of rescheduling probability by nine to twelve percent for the earlier periods and 18 to 35 percent for later periods. Citron and Nickelsburg (1986) point out that the political variable is in fact a non diversifiable risk and identify waves of default which tend to occur in approximately thirty year cycles and typically involve many countries. Georgievska et al. (2009) confirm the importance of political factors in determining debt rescheduling probabilities in emerging markets. Kraay and Nehru (2004) were the first to point that quality of institutions and policies has a key impact on rescheduling. Further, Butler and Fauver (2006) found that the quality of a country's legal and political institutions play a vital role in determining sovereign credit ratings. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) find that the flows of capital from rich countries to poor countries are largely governed by sovereign default probabilities.
A number of studies is also assessing the impact of past debt repayment record on the future rescheduling. For example, Carmen (1992) , McFadden et al (1985) and Aylward and Thorne (1998) find that the poor debt repayment history is a strong indicator of future problems. Ciarlone and Trebeschi (2005) use financial market data to analyze the behavior of CDSs spreads. Schwartz and Zurita (1992) develop a model which determines the optimal amount of debt to borrow based on the production possibilities of the country, time preferences and the risk free interest rate. The study also gives the optimal level of debt default penalty: the higher the penalty that can be imposed on the country in the event of default the lower the probability of default but higher the problem of underinvestment. These arguments are relevant for considering possible new debt authorization to the countries of Eastern Europe.
EE Countries' Recent Economic Position
The European Central Bank considers investing in EE countries during the transition period as potentially problematic due to two main reasons 4 : 1) credit growth can affect financial stability and financing 'bad' projects will eventually turn into bad debt or result in a build-up of large external debt, and 2) policymakers and market participants need to assess and monitor credit growth developments as in the past they have been associated with the emergence of financial and currency crises.
In the early years of the transition, most EE countries experienced a significant slump in GDP, which was followed by a period of rapid economic growth. In some cases, rapid privatization of the banking sector and expansion of underdeveloped financial markets resulted in lending booms followed by credit crunches and crises that spilled over to the region as a whole. Hoti (2005) , for example, analyses country-specific and regional 1) economic, 2) financial, 3) political and 4) composite risk factors for six Balkan countries and documents significant country spill-over effects.
Eastern Europe is the only emerging market region with systematic current account deficits in [2005] [2006] . According to Roubini and Menegatti (2006) (2007)). In addition, Hungary observed asset bubbles in equity and housing markets. Schafer (2006) indicates that these countries' economic boom is financed by foreign lending and concludes that it may lead to financial crisis.
World Economic Outlook (2006) reports that the region's generally large current account deficits partly reflects favorable investment opportunities in EE region. In some countries capital inflows were associated not just with private sector financial imbalances but also with substantial fiscal imbalances (e.g. Hungary, Poland and Slovakia). However, WEO (2006) stresses that the large net capital inflows are increasing not in the form of FDIs but rather in the form of other (more volatile) flows, including short-term debt. Specifically, the EE region became the largest recipient of net non-FDI flows among all emerging market regions in 2005. This has implications for policymakers and potential investors who need to examine the trade off between the sovereign capacities and the risks involved. Roubini and Menegatti (2006) distinguish between solvency and liquidity variables in EE region, which are also potential determinants of sovereign debt rescheduling. This study reports high and rising levels of external debt as a share of GDP, especially for Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia and debt to export ratio for Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Slovenia, Croatia, and Romania. Liquidity risk measured as a share of money in foreign exchange reserves (M2/FX ratio) is well above one for all countries in the sample of this study. In addition, short term debt/FX ratio is rising in Hungary, Croatia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Gross external financing needs (measured as short term debt plus current account deficit as a share of foreign exchange reserves) are greater than one also for all countries. Public sector vulnerabilities are presented through share of foreign currency public debt in total debt which is greater than 50% in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The share of short term public debt in total debt is high (above 30%) in Czech Republic and Poland and medium (20-30%) in Hungary, Croatia, Lithuania and Slovakia. Public debt to GDP ratio is high (above 50%) only in Hungary and Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, more relevant measure of solvency, pubic debt to government revenues ratio is relatively high (above 100%) in a larger set of countries:
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Overall, general government deficits are medium to high in Hungary, Slovakia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Slovenia and Romania.
Note that nine of the selected countries in our sample are now members of the European Union (EU): Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic and very recently Romania and Bulgaria. This will be taken into account in our models.
DATA SAMPLE
Annual data on rescheduling event and determinants of rescheduling is collected for 15 EE countries over the period 1990-2005. Our study includes countries of Central EE (Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Poland), South EE (Croatia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bulgaria and Romania), Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lethonia) and Russia. The reason for this lies in their common historical heritage and initial economic conditions on which they started period of transition in the early 1990s.
Defining the Dependent Variable: default or recheduling event
Previous literature shows that there is no single empirical definition of what should constitute a sovereign debt crisis, default or a rescheduling event (see for example Manasse, Roubini and Schimmelpfennig (2003) , Ciarlone and Trebeschi (2005) , Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) , Hajivassiliou (1987) , Odedokun (1995) and Kraay and Nehru (2004) ). Broadly speaking, a default is any failure by a debtor to meet its contractual obligations. The main event of default is missing a scheduled payment of principal or interest.
In this paper the dependent variable is defined as the 'total amount of debt rescheduled' as is In the model that we intend to use, the event of weather or not rescheduling took place is dichotomous and qualitative variable. Therefore, the dependent variable is a binary variable possessing only two possible values or outcomes: 
Variables used as possible determinants of debt recheduling
We start our analysis with 40 macroeconomic, financial and political indicators that can potentially explain counties' sovereign debt rescheduling probabilities. This large number of variables will then be reduced to the significantly smaller number through several econometric steps, discussed in Section 3. The variables are divided in nine categories, specifically: 1) solvency, 2) liquidity, 3) variables used in currency crisis models, 4) macroeconomic variables, 5) external trade ratios 6) public debt ratios, 7) financial variables, 5 including debt stock rescheduled, interest rescheduled capitalized, interest rescheduled official, interest rescheduled private, principal rescheduled official, principal rescheduled private and principal rescheduled. Debt from official creditors includes loans from international organizations (such as World Bank, EBRD or other multilateral and intergovernmental agencies) and loans from governments (bilateral loans). Debt from private creditors include bonds, commercial bank loans from private banks and other private financial institutions and other private credits (from manufacturers, exporters, suppliers of goods and bank credits covered by a guarantee of an export credit agency) 8) past rescheduling record and 9) the political variable proxied by ICRG Index
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. The list of all variables and the impact that each one is expected to have on the probability of rescheduling is shown in Table 2 .
-Insert Table 2- The descriptive statistics associated with these variables for countries that have rescheduled during the sample period, as well as for those that have not, are presented in Table A1 in Appendix 1.
Three main sources of data used to compile the set of variables described in Sections 3. 
EMPIRICAL MODEL SPECIFICATION
Using all 40 variables at the same time, would result in an overly complicated model, with many potentially significant coefficients appearing as statistically indistinguishable from zero, i.e. multicolinearity and over-fitting of the model may cause biased values of the significance test. Therefore, to eliminate less relevant variables, we proceed along a threestage strategy.
Stage 1: Selecting Relevant Variables -Univariate Logit
At the first stage, we run univariate panel logit regressions for each of the 40 variables independently from one another. This will enable us to exclude from the final model all the variables that turn out to be insignificant in determining whether the sovereign reschedules its debt or not.
To define a panel logit model, consider a country i observed over T periods of time, where t = 1,….,T and i = 1,…,N. For this country there exists an unobservable 7 random variable y* it indicating latent propensity. Whilst we do not observe y* it directly, we do observe a binary outcome y it such that y it = 1(y* it > 0) where y it is termed the indicator function taking the value 1 if the condition within parentheses is satisfied, and 0 otherwise. An example of this might be the amount of total debt rescheduled (y it ), and the capability of the country to pay its debts (y* it ). y* it is a function of explanatory variable(s) x it , constant unobserved individual county effects α i and random error term u it . The following equation represents the above:
y it is a dummy variable defined by:
For any  , the probability of observing the outcomes it y is conditional on the values of variable it x . For the panel logit model, the probability that a sovereign i will reschedule its debt at time t is given as: Thus, from each dimension (component), we have selected no more than two to three variables (12 in total), according to the highest factor loading, which are sufficient in explaining the whole dimension. The results of rotated factor matrix are presented in Table   A2 in Appendix 2. Note that the probability of rescheduling in a multivariate panel logit framework is obtained in the similar manner as in equation (3): that state dependence appears to be very important in the case of sovereign debt rescheduling (as found in Aylward and Thorne (1998) , Hajivassiliou (1989 Hajivassiliou ( , 1994 , McFadden et al. (1985) , Brewer and Rivoli (1997) , Carmen (1992) among many others).
RESULTS
The results for Model I, Model II and Model IIa are presented in detail in Table 3 .
-Insert Since the logit model is non-linear, the coefficients obtained by the Model I do not explain the contribution of each variable to the probability of rescheduling, but instead they represent odds ratios which are not easily interpreted. Therefore, we calculate the real marginal effects that each of the variable has on the dependent variable.
A closer look at the marginal effects for Model I shows significant impact of explanatory variables on the probability of debt rescheduling, both 'fixed' explanatory variables and those less typically found in literature on emerging market debt recheduling probabilities. For example, an increase in one unit of the 'fixed' variable Total Debt/GDP causes an increase in debt rescheduling probability by 2.55%, while a unit increase of Exports/GDP ratio causes decrease in sovereign debt rescheduling probability by 7.03%. Increase in a unit of Current 9
Random effects Panel Logit Model (REM) is appropriate when there are cross sectional differences or heterogeneity and this hetereogeneity is assumed to be not correlated with the regressors of the model. Account/GDP ratio causes increase in sovereign debt rescheduling probability by 5.06%.
This may seem counter intuitive, since it implies that the higher the current account surplus, the more likely is that the country will reshedule its debt. However, for transitional economies, such as the countries in our sample, current account deficits are associated with higher growth and financial integration in the region (see Abiad et. al., 2007) , which in turn can lead to improvement of debt repayment record of a country. Foreign Direct
Investment/GDP ratio variable shows the level of openness of the country and is a significant indicator of business climate in the country that wants to attract potential investments, so it is not a surprise that its unit increase causes decrease in sovereign debt rescheduling probability by 9.4%. Additionally, countries in transition are well known for their high levels of government spending, therefore, in our sample, a unit increase of Government Expenditure/GDP ratio causes a massive increase in sovereign debt rescheduling probability of 19.25%.
Furthermore, in Table 2 , we show that impact of Credits to private sector/GDP and Short term debt share in total debt variables on probability of debt rescheduling can be somewhat ambiguous. Both of those variables are significant at the 5% level and negatively related to probability of debt rescheduling. Specifically, it seems that a country is less likely to reschedule if there is a higher percentage of Short term debt in Total debt. In countries in transition, given their economic and other uncertainties and risks
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, it is not surprising that short-term debt would be percieved as less likely to default than the long-term one. In terms of Credits to private sector/GDP, it is possible that private sector investments in transition economies are perceived to show higher levels of credibility than the public sector. Further, this variable can be an indicator of ownership restructuring and potentials for higher future GDP growth, which in turn decreases the probability of sovereign debt rescheduling. Thus, increase in Credits to private sector can decrease the risk of sovereign debt rescheduling probability as a strong indicator of private sector development in transition countries that investors take into account when they calculate net present values of their investments.
Model II and its explanatory variables are jointly significant at 1% level. Although majority of the variables used in the model are significant, such as the 'fixed' variables (at 1% or 5% level), GDP growth (at 1% level) and lagged rescheduling event (at 1% level), our findings show that political factors (ICRG index) and liquidity variable M2/Reserves do not significanlty influence debt recheduling in the region.
Marginal effects in Model II show that one additional debt rescheduling event increases the probability that the country will reschedule in the future by 3.85%. A unit increase in Total debt/GDP and Current Account/GDP increase the probability of debt rescheduling by 3.79% and 9.29% respectively, whereas a unit increase in Export/GDP and GDP growth rate decrease the probability of debt rescheduling by 10.29% and 5.54% respectively. Persistently high influence of Export/GDP variable in both Model I and Model II can be explained by the fact that countries that we are focusing on are mainly small open economies, highly influenced by terms of international trade and finances. At the same time, exports are generating revenues, GDP growth and represent the drivers of stability of these countries. In conclusion, besides the current account and the level of total debt burden, these small open economies' investment opportunities are highly dependent on their past rescheduling records.
One of the results of Model II that we believe requires more attention, is the insignificance of political variable, which was found to be important in many previous studies. One reason for this could be the decrease of potential political risks and stabilisation in the region.
Specifically, in the later part of our sample period, most of the countries entered the final phase of transition while some of them joined the European Union. To check for the ultimate importance of being a member of the European Union (perceived in this context as a political factor variable), we extend Model II by includeind an EU dummy variable to create Model IIa. The insignificant EU dummy coefficient in Model IIa implies that the EU membership does not affect sovereign debt rescheduling probabilities in EE countries during the sample period.
Overall, in terms of determinants of debt rescheduling, it turns out that variables which are more specific for countries in transition have greater impact on debt rescheduling than variables traditionally considered as the most influential ones according to the literature (e.g. political factors, reserves to imports, total debt service payment to exports, inflation, indicators of exchange rate overvaluation, etc.)
In the search for the most accurate model, in terms of the higher forecasting accuracy and lower Type I and type two errors, Model I appears better than Model II and Model IIa in that it has a higher prediction level (81.37% of correct classification) and very low Type II error (3.73%). However, the Type I error for Model I is quite high (14.9%). Since for international lenders it is potentially more important to correctly classify actual reschedulings (than actual investors. Therefore, the analysis suggests that in order to control both for the model accuracy and the Type I error, investors should find both of these models useful.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper provides new empirical evidence about the determinants and importance of international and country specific macroeconomic indicators of the sovereign debt rescheduling probabilities of the EE countries. During the last decade, the EE countries became very attractive European region creating an investment boom. Specifically, the region became the largest recipient of net non-FDI flows among all emerging market regions in
2005. Developing models that can provide more accurate estimates of debt rescheduling probabilities in this region can benefit the investors as well as the host countries.
This study estimates sovereign default/rescheduling probabilities using panel logit models on a sample of 15 EE countries over the period 1990-2005. Compared to previous studies performed in this area, this paper combines different econometric metodologies to develop models with high degree of accuracy.
The findings show that in predicting the debt rescheduling probabilities one should utilise both of the two models suggested. Particularly, the models imply that EE countries, which want to reduce their probabilities of rescheduling, therefore reducing cost of borrowing and/or improve access to credit, should generally: 1) Control and reduce their General Government Expenditures by restructuring the public sector, attract more Foreign Direct Investments and stimulate GDP growth.
2) Increase their Export revenues by implementing a strategic trade policy in order to balance Current Account 3) Have a good repayment performance by limiting the size of the external debt compared to their GDP and do not default on sovereign debt as a result of unwillingness rather than inability to repay.
Furthermore, even though in the long run EU membership may improve the countries debt repayment perfomance and sovereign rating, our findings suggest that this political aspect is not significant for the sample period that we analysed. (a) If the private sector debt increases relative to the overall economy, the probability of rescheduling by private banks and companies increases. However, in transition countries, this variable can be the indicator of restructuring, development and future potentials for GDP growth, which has a negative relationship with the probability of sovereign debt rescheduling. Thus, indirectly, we expect this variable to be negatively related to probability of recheduling.
APPENDIX 1
(b) The impact of this variable is ambiguous since on one hand the higher proportion of short term debt in total debt can lead to liquidity risks but on the other, investors can decrease their risk investing in country on short terms without being exposed to rescheduling probability in the long term period in future. Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001) stress that in fact countries with imminent debt crises can only borrow short-term.
(c) The higher the imports in relation to the size of the economy this country is more vulnerable to foreign shocks, and more likely to external debt rescheduling. Thus the expected coefficient of this variable should be positive (Frenkel, 1983) . However, it can be debated whether this is always true. The higher this ratio, the more open economy is. Thus the country would not be willing to risk trade embargo or being ostracised in international economic arena due to default on external debt (Odedokun, 1995) . Period Analysed 1990-2005 1990-2005 1990-2005 (a) Marginal effects are calculated at the sample means of the independent variables except for the dummy lagged rescheduling variable where the marginal effect is calculated for discrete change from 0 to 1 * significant at 10% level of significance ** significant at 5% level of significance *** significant at 1% level of significance
